The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission will issue a 576-page book tomorrow that concludes that "the 2008 financial crisis was an 'avoidable' disaster caused by widespread failures in government regulation, corporate mismanagement and heedless risk-taking by Wall Street," according to a front page article by Sewell Chan in today's edition of The New York Times.

The article said that the "commission that investigated the crisis casts a wide net of blame, faulting two administrations, the Federal Reserve and other regulators for permitting a calamitous concoction: shoddy mortgage lending, the excessive packaging and sale of loans to investors and risky bets on securities backed by the loans."

The report's conclusions were read by The Times and stated that "The greatest tragedy would be to accept the refrain that no one could have seen this coming and thus nothing could have been done," adding that "If we accept this notion, it will happen again."

The report was based on 19 days of hearings and more than 700 interviews.

Of the 10 commission members, the six appointed by Democrats endorsed the final report. Three Republican members have prepared a dissent focusing on a narrower set of causes; a fourth Republican, Peter J. Wallison, has his own dissent, calling policies to promote homeownership the major culprit. The article said that the "panel was hobbled repeatedly by internal divisions and staff turnover."

The majority report found fault with two Fed chairmen: Alan Greenspan, who led the central bank as the housing bubble expanded, and his successor, Ben S. Bernanke, who did not foresee the crisis but played a crucial role in the response.

The article said that the reported criticized Mr. Greenspan for advocating deregulation and cites a "pivotal failure to stem the flow of toxic mortgages" under his leadership as a "prime example" of negligence.

It also criticized the Bush administration's "inconsistent response" to the crisis - allowing Lehman Brothers to collapse in September 2008 after earlier bailing out another bank, Bear Stearns, with Fed help - as having "added to the uncertainty and panic in the financial markets," the article continued.

Like Mr. Bernanke, Mr. Bush's Treasury secretary, Henry M. Paulson Jr., predicted in 2007 - wrongly, it turned out - that the subprime collapse would be contained, the report noted.

The decision in 2000 to shield the exotic financial instruments known as over-the-counter derivatives from regulation, made during the last year of President Bill Clinton's term, is called "a key turning point in the march toward the financial crisis," the article said.

Timothy F. Geithner, who was president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York during the crisis and is now the Treasury secretary, was not unscathed; the report finds that the New York Fed missed signs of trouble at Citigroup and Lehman, though it did not have the main responsibility for overseeing them.

The article said the report was "harsh on regulators" and found that "the Securities and Exchange Commission failed to require big banks to hold more capital to cushion potential losses and halt risky practices, and that the Fed 'neglected its mission.'"

It also said the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, which regulates some banks, and the Office of Thrift Supervision, which oversees savings and loans, blocked states from curbing abuses because they were "caught up in turf wars."